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For a discrete infinity of reasons, Ian Roberts is to be celebrated. Here we discuss
how his important work has caused us to rethink what could be, arguably, the
most unbelievable and extraordinary aspect of language: its universality. In partic-
ular, we proffer Roberts’ theory of parameter hierarchies to corroborate an econ-
omy thesis – a thesis implying that the quiddities of language transcend human
language, and would obtain of any language anywhere in the universe.
1 Beyond the infinite
As far as anyone knows, spaceships have been successfully built by exactly
one civilisation in the entire history of the universe: by post-1957 humans
(the Space Age actually happens to coincide exactly with my lifetime, al-
though I had nothing to do with it) (Roberts 2017: 1)
Ian Roberts may not have been amongst those to engineer the Space Age, but
he is one of the best to have explained (indirectly) how it was possible, and ex-
planation is the prerequisite for all progress in scientific understanding and its
technological applications. Specifically, Roberts has over his career explained
how human language – its structure, acquisition, and historical change – has
propelled our species to being the paragon of animals – to go “beyond the infi-
nite” in Kubrick’s words.
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Chimps, who allegedly share around 98 percent of their genes with us, […]
show no interplanetary ambitions […]. Our extra 2 percent makes us ex-
tremely good – by the standards of everything else in the known universe,
unbelievably, extraordinarily, cosmically good – at generating, storing and
transmitting knowledge. How do we do it? With language.
(Roberts 2017: 1–2)
In this, the sixth decade of Roberts’ cosmic existence, we celebrate him and how
his work has caused us to rethink what could be, arguably, the most unbelievable
and extraordinary aspect of language: its universality. In particular, we proffer
Roberts’ theory of parameter hierarchies to corroborate an economy thesis – a
thesis implying that the quiddities of language transcend human language, and
would obtain of any language anywhere in the universe.
2 A universal instrument
The humanmind, Descartes argued, is undoubtedly in some sense a “universal in-
strument”. We cannot know with certainty what he intended by this provocative
comment, but we do know that the Cartesians would have understood language
as fundamental to any nontrivial notion of “universality” because it is language
that empowers humans to generate an unbounded set of hierarchically struc-
tured expressions that can enter into effectively infinitely many thoughts and
actions – that is, the competence of every human, but no beast or machine, to
use language in creative ways appropriate to situations but not caused by them,
and to formulate and express these thoughts coherently and without bound, per-
haps “incited or inclined” to speak in particular ways by internal and external
circumstances but not “compelled” to do so. Of course in the pre-Turing world,
the Cartesians did not know how a finite “machine” such as the brain could gen-
erate the infinity of expressions of natural language, and therefore posited a soul
where we need only posit a neurobiological Turing machine (obviously idealized
with unbounded memory, etc.). Nevertheless Descartes intuited the essence of
Turing universality: “Only a spiritual entity could achieve the limitlessness of in-
teractive language, putting words together in indefinitely many ways”, and to do
so in ways that are “free” (i.e., not compelled by internal or external conditions)
and intelligible and appropriate to situations, and to do so over an unbounded
range in different domains.
Any material machine must specialize: while a machine might do very well
some of the things people do, it would necessarily be unable to do others.
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Any part or organ needed a particular configuration to achieve a task, and
it was impossible to have enough different parts with the requisite configu-
rations in a single machine to make it act in all the contingencies of life in
the same way that our reason makes us act. Only disembodied reason could
be ‘a universal instrument’. (Riskin 2017: 63)
Of course the genius of Turing was to discover that “[i]t is possible to invent
a single machine which can be used to compute any computable sequence”; he
called this mathematical object, appropriately, the “universal machine” (Turing
1937: 243).
Linguistic competence (and especially its creative use), in concert with other
mental faculties, establishes the general intelligence necessary for the evolution-
ary “great leap forward” of our species (see Chomsky 2016). As Roberts (2017:
182) conjects, “there might have been a crucial mutation in human evolution
which led, in almost no time from an evolutionary perspective, from [humans
living in] caves to [their creating knowledge of such sophistication as to enable
us to imagine and construct things as complex as, say,] spaceships. It’s a plausi-
ble speculation that the mutation in question was whatever it is that makes our
brains capable of computing recursive syntax, since it’s the recursive syntax that
really gives language – and thought – their unlimited expressive power. It’s one
small step from syntax to spaceships, but a great leap for humans”. A great leap
for humans – and only humans, evidently (see Berwick & Chomsky 2016). The
architecture of intelligence necessitates “provisions for recursive, hierarchical
use of previous results” as manifested in the “articulation” of a complex struc-
ture into descriptions of “elementary figures” and “subexpressions designating
complex subfigures”, with a “figure first divided into two parts; and then with
each part described using the same machinery” (Minsky 1963: 16). The recursive
capacity of intelligence is most manifest in natural language:
Whatever we can express or describe, we can treat its expression or de-
scription as though it was a single component inside another description. In
languages, this corresponds to using embedded phrases and clauses. That
final trick – of representing prior thoughts as things – gives our minds the
awesome power to use the same brain-machinery over and over again, to
replace entire conceptualizations by compact symbols, and hence to build
gigantic structures of ideas the way our children build great bridges and
towers from simple separate blocks. It lets us build new ideas from old ones;
in short, it makes it possible to think. The same is true of our [future] com-
puters. (Minsky 1985: 124)
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Thus wemight expect any (super-)human-level intelligence anywhere in the uni-
verse – including any genuine artificial intelligence (“our [future] computers”)
we create – to be recursive in this way.
It has been assumed that the essential properties of human language are not
only unique, but logically contingent:
Let us define “universal grammar” (UG) as the system of principles, condi-
tions, and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages not
merely by accident but by necessity – of course, I mean biological, not log-
ical necessity. Thus UG can be taken as expressing “the essence of human
language”. (Chomsky 1975: 29)
There is no a priori reason to expect that human language will have such
properties; Martian could be different.” (Chomsky 2000: 16)
This assumption, we submit, merits rethinking in light of Roberts’ work and
progress in theMinimalist programmore generally (Chomsky 1995). Recentwork
demonstrating the simplicity (Watumull et al. 2017) and optimality (Chomsky et
al. 2019) of language increases the cogency of a conjecture that at one time would
have been summarily dismissed as absurd: “the basic principles of language are
formulated in terms of notions drawn from the domain of (virtual) conceptual
necessity”, the domain defined by “general considerations of conceptual natural-
ness that have some independent plausibility, namely, simplicity, economy, sym-
metry, nonredundancy, and the like” (Chomsky 1995: 171, 1) that render linguistic
computation interestingly optimal. To the extent that this strong Minimalist the-
sis (SMT) is true, the essential – computational (even mathematical) – properties
of language would derive from laws of nature – language- and even biology-
independent principles that, once realized in the mind/brain, do entail particular
properties as logically necessary. For instance, it is simply a fact of logic that
the simplest (optimal) form of the recursive procedure generative of syntactic
structures, Merge, has two and only two forms of application (i.e., external and
internal). Relatedly, given the nature of the structures Merge generates, minimal
structure distance is necessarily the simplest computation for the structure de-
pendence of rules. And so on and so forth (see Berwick et al. 2011; Chomsky
2013; Watumull 2015 for additional examples).
Research in the Minimalist program starts with the optimality conjecture and
proceeds to inquire whether and to what extent it can be sustained given the
observed complexities and variety of natural languages. If a gap is discovered,
the task is to inquire whether the data can be reinterpreted, or whether princi-
ples of simplicity and optimal computation can be reformulated, so as to solve
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the puzzles within the framework of SMT, thus generating some support, in an
interesting and unexpected domain, for Galileo’s precept that nature is simple
and it is the task of the scientist to demonstrate it.
As we discover more and more of “the essence of human language” to be de-
fined by (virtual) conceptual necessity, the less and less absurd it is to question
just how contingent a phenomenon human language really is. It may well be
with language as with other phenomena studied in the natural sciences that, in
the words of the sage physicist J.A. Wheeler, “[b]ehind it all is surely an idea so
simple, so beautiful, that when we grasp it – in a decade, a century, or a millen-
nium–wewill all say to each other, how could it have been otherwise?” (Wheeler
1986: 386). In other words, there may well be some a priori reasons to expect hu-
man language to have the (essential) properties it does; or, to put it whimsically,
the Martian language might not be so different from human language after all.
In short, the universality of universal grammar needs to be rethought.
3 Simplicity itself
Our rethinking is based on a rethinking – or reminding – of simplicity as orig-
inally conceived in generative linguistics. “[S]implicity, economy, compactness,
etc.” were proffered in the first work on generative grammar as criteria the gram-
mar of a language must satisfy: “Such considerations are in general not trivial
or “merely esthetic”. It has been recognized of philosophical systems, and it is, I
think, no less true of grammatical systems, that the motives behind the demand
for economy are in many ways the same as those behind the demand that there
be a system at all” (Chomsky 1951: 1, 67). This proposition echoed that of Good-
man (1943: 107): “The motives for seeking economy in the basis of a system are
much the same as the motives for constructing the system itself”. The idea is ele-
mentary but profound: if the theory is no more simple, economical, compact, etc.
than the data it is proffered to explain, it is not a theory at all; hence the more
compressed the theory, the more successful – i.e., the more explanatory – it is.
The mathematician Gregory Chaitin (2005: 64) has formalized this idea in
terms of algorithmic information theory: “a scientific theory [can be thought
of] as a binary computer program for calculating observations, which are also
written in binary”; a generative grammar can thus be thought of as a program
for generating syntactic structures. “And you have a law of nature if there is
compression, if the experimental data is compressed into a computer program”,
equivalently a grammar, “that has a smaller number of bits than are in the data
that it explains”, or generates. “The greater the degree of compression, the better
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the law, the more you understand the data. But if the experimental data cannot
be compressed, if the smallest program for calculating it is just as large as it is
[...], then the data is lawless, unstructured, patternless, not amenable to scien-
tific study, incomprehensible. In a word, random, irreducible”. In the terms of
generative grammar (Chomsky & Miller 1963: 285):
As a matter of principle, a grammar must be finite. If we permit ourselves
grammars with an unspecifiable set of rules[,] we can simply adopt an infi-
nite sentence dictionary. But that would be a completely meaningless pro-
posal. Clearly, a grammar must have the status of a theory about those reg-
ularities that we call the syntactic structure of the language.
To have the status of a theory, the grammar must be compressed, generating –
and thereby explaining – the regularities in syntactic structures.
This idea is appreciated surprisingly seldom today: many computational cog-
nitive scientists and machine learning theorists (and hence virtually all “artifi-
cial intelligence” (AI) labs in academia and industry) have perversely redefined
a successful theory or computer program to be one that merely approximates or
classifies unanalyzed data. This contrasts dramatically with the Enlightenment
definition in which data are selectively analyzed as evidence for/against conjec-
tured explanations (see Popper 1963; Chomsky 2000; Deutsch 2011). The machine
learning systems (e.g., deep learning neural nets, reinforcement learning tech-
niques, etc.) so popular in the current “AI spring” are weak AI : brute-force sys-
tems laboriously trained to “unthinkingly” associate patterns in the input data to
produce outputs that approximate those data in a process with no resemblance to
human cognition (thus betraying Turing’s original vision for AI). These systems
will never be genuinely intelligent, and are to be contrasted with the strong –
anthronoetic – AI Turing envisioned: a program designed to attain human-level
competence with a human-style typified by syntactic generativity and semantic
fluidity – to think the way a human thinks. Today such programs, based on gen-
erative grammars, are finally being built.1
The early discussions on simplicity were addressing the logic of theory con-
struction by the scientist, but later (Chomsky 1965: 4) this logic was analogized
to the learning of language by children: “The problem for the linguist, as well as
for the child learning the language, is to determine from the data of performance
the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer”. To
determine the grammar (qua “theory” in the mind of the learner and qua theory




is necessary. Specifically, a format-evaluation framework: “(v) specification of a
function𝑚 such that𝑚(𝑖) is an integer associatedwith the grammarG𝑖 as its value
(with, let us say, lower value indicated by higher number)” (Chomsky 1965: 31).
Naturally, “simpler” grammars are more highly valued, but, then as now, “sim-
plicity” is complex: “In the context of this discussion, ‘simplicity’ (that is, the
evaluation measure 𝑚 of (v)) is a notion to be defined within linguistic theory
along with “grammar”, “phoneme”, etc. Choice of simplicity measure is rather
like determination of the value of a physical constant” (Chomsky 1965: 37–38).
Goodman (1943: 107–108) too was cognizant of the complexity of simplicity, ob-
serving that “the mere counting of primitives is no satisfactory measure” because
“by the purelymechanical application of certain logical devices, we can readily re-
duce all the primitives of any system to one”. Thus while Goodman searched for
a general notion of simplicity applicable to all systems, a specific notion applica-
ble to language was sought in generative linguistics, and both ultimately “failed”
(i.e., superseded by better notions – characteristic of a healthy science): the for-
mer for technical reasons, the latter because of the success of the principles-and-
parameters (P&P) framework (Chomsky 1981), which obviated the need for any
simplicity measure of the type envisioned for the format-evaluation framework.
4 The principles-and-parameters mission
In P&P, language acquisition is the process of setting the values for the finitely
many universal parameters of the initial state of the language faculty (UG). The
apparent complexity and diversity of linguistic phenomena is illusory and epi-
phenomenal, emerging from the interaction of invariant principles under vary-
ing conditions. This was a radical shift from the early work in generative linguis-
tics, which sought only an evaluation measure that would select among alterna-
tive theories of a language (grammars) – the simplest congruent with the format
encoded in UG and consistent with the primary linguistic data. But with the P&P
shift in perspective, simplicity can be rethought, though this was not initially ap-
preciated. As discussed in the earliest work in generative linguistics, notions of
simplicity assume two distinct forms: the imprecise but profound notion of sim-
plicity that enters into rational inquiry generally, and the theory-internal mea-
sure of simplicity that selects among I-languages. The former notion of simplicity
is language-independent, but the theory-internal notion is a component of UG,
a subcomponent of the procedure for determining the relation between experi-
ence and I-language (again, something like a physical constant). In early work,
the internal notion was implemented in the form of the evaluation procedure
to select among proposed grammars/I-languages consistent with the UG format
9
Jeffrey Watumull & Noam Chomsky
for rule systems. But, as Ian Roberts (2012) and others (e.g., Sheehan et al. 2017)
discovered, the P&P approach transcends that limited, parochial conception of
simplicity: with no evaluation procedure, there is no internal notion of simplicity
in the earlier sense. There remains only the universal notion of simplicity.
In P&P, grammars – I-languages – are simple, but, as evidenced in Roberts’
work (e.g., Roberts & Holmberg 2010), they are so by virtue of third-factor prin-
ciples of computational efficiency (Chomsky 2005), not by analogy to theory-
construction or by stipulation in UG. In fact, rather than “simple”, we propose to
define P&P-style acquisition as “economical”, which, in the Leibnizian spirit, we
understand to subsume simplicity:
The most economical idea, like the most economical engine, is the one that
accomplishes most by using least. Simplicity – or fuel consumption – is a
different factor from power [i.e., generative capacity, empirical coverage,
etc.] but has to be taken equally into consideration […]. The economy of
a basis may be said to be the ratio of its strength to its simplicity. But su-
perfluous power is also a waste. Adequacy for a given system is the only
relevant factor in the power of a basis; and where we are comparing several
alternative bases for some one system, as is normally the case, that factor
is a constant. Thus in practice the simplest basis is the most economical.
(Goodman 1943: 111)
Economy, in other words, is a minimax notion. In Leibniz’s words (see Roberts
& Watumull 2015): “the simplicity of the means counterbalances the richness of
the effects” so that in nature “the maximum effect [is] produced by the simplest
means”. This notion is enshrined in the Galilean ideal (see Chomsky 2002).
One economical form of P&P-style learning explicable in terms of third-factors
is the traversal of a parameter hierarchy (see Roberts 2012; Biberauer 2016) – pa-
rameter specification. In such a system, the child is not unthinkingly enumerat-
ing and evaluating grammars.2 Instead, the I-language matures to a steady state
in a relatively deterministic process of “answering questions” that emerge nat-
urally and necessarily in the sense that there exist “choices” in acquisition that
logically must be “made” for the system to function at all; none of the parame-
ters need be encoded in the genetic endowment (see Obata et al. 2015 for similar
ideas). This is the ideal, of course. Like SMT generally, how closely it can be
approximated is an empirical matter, and there remain many challenges.
2Such an inefficient and unintelligent technique is the modus operandi of many machine learn-
ing (weak AI) systems.
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Parameter specification – i.e., the P&P-conception of “learning” as the speci-
fication of values for the variables in I-language – can be schematized as a de-
cision tree (parameter hierarchy) which, as Roberts has shown, is governed by
minimax economy: minimizing formal features (feature-economy) coupled with
maximizing accessible features (input-generalization). Traversal of a hierarchy –
a conditional-branching Turing machine program – is inevitably economical in
that the shortest (in binary) and most general parameter settings are necessarily
“preferred” in the sense that the faster the computation halts, the shorter the pa-
rameter settings. For instance, to specify word-order, a series of binary queries




Present on all heads?
no









For compatibility with computability theory and Boolean logic, the parameter
hierarchy can be translated as follows:
(1) Hierarchy: H
State T : Decision problem
Yes: 0/1 (0 = transition to state T+1) (1 = halt and output parameter
specification for H )
No: 0/1 (0 = transition to state T+1) (1 = halt and output parameter
specification for H )
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(2) Hierarchy: Word order
State 1: Is head-final present?
Yes: Output 0 (transition to State 2)
No: Output 1 (halt and output “head-initial”)
State 2: Present on all heads?
Yes: Output 1 (halt and output “head-final”)
No: Output 0 (transition to State 3)
State 3: Present on [+V] heads?
Yes: Output 1 (halt and output “head-final in clause only”)
No: Output 0 (transition to State 4)
…
So in P&P, the logic is not “enumerate and evaluate” with stipulative (theory-
internal) simplicity measures: it is “compute all and only what is necessary”,
which implies the language-independent reality of economy in that, as with the
parameter hierarchies, the process answers all and only the questions it needs to.
It is not that there is any explicit instruction in the genetic endowment to prefer
simple answers: it is simply otiose and meaningless to answer unasked questions
(i.e., once the parameters are set, the computation halts).3
Moreover the “answers” to “questions” can be represented in binary. Indeed bi-
nary is a notation-independent notion necessary and sufficient to maximize com-
putation with minimal complexity: functions of arbitrarily many arguments can
be realized by the composition of binary (but not unary) functions – a truth of
minimax logic with “far-reaching significance for our understanding of the func-
tional architecture of the brain” (Gallistel & King 2010: x). The mathematical and
computational import of binary was rendered explicit in the theories of Turing
(1937) and Shannon (1948), the former demonstrating the necessarily digital –
hence ultimately binary – nature of universal computation (a universal Turing
machine being the most general mathematical characterization of computation);
the latter formalizing information in terms of bits (binary digits). The consilience
of these ideas is our economy thesis: human language is based on simple repre-
sentations (i.e., bits) and strong computations (i.e., the binary functions of Turing
machines) – and “economy of a basis may be said to be the ratio of its strength
to its simplicity” (Goodman 1943: 111).
3In this way it is trivial to derive Ockham’s razor from virtual conceptual necessity. If the law of
parsimony is not to multiple entities beyond necessity, and language conforms to conceptual
necessity, then ergo it is maximally parsimonious. AsWittgenstein (1922) observed: “Ockham’s
maxim is, of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is justified by its success in practice: its
point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing” (5.47321); “If a sign is useless,




As one of the “general considerations of conceptual naturalness that have some
independent plausibility”, economy would be a factor that obtains of any opti-
mally “designed” (natural or artificial) computational system. So, rethinking uni-
versality, if the Martian language were optimal in the sense of conforming to
virtual conceptual necessity, then it might be surprisingly similar to human lan-
guage. In point of fact, we ought not to be too surprised. It is nowwell established
by biologists that convergence is a common theme in any evolutionary process:
the number of evolutionary end-points is limited: by nomeans is everything
possible. [Because of evolutionary convergence,] what is possible usually
has been arrived at multiple times, meaning that the emergence of the var-
ious biological properties is effectively inevitable.
(Conway Morris 2013: xii–xiii)
Indeed, the paleontologist Simon Conway Morris argues that human-style in-
telligence was effectively inevitable given the initial conditions of evolution on
Earth. And there is no reason a priori to assume that the principle of evolutionary
convergence is unique to the biology of a particular planet. Quite the contrary,
if we accept the rational form of inquiry in which the principle is understood
abstractly in a computational framework. The idea is that any computational
system anywhere made of anything is governed by laws of computation. As the
cognitive scientist C.R. Gallistel and computer scientist Adam King argue per-
suasively (Gallistel & King 2010: 167):
The functional structure of modern computers is sometimes discussed by
neuroscientists as if it were an accidental consequence of the fact that com-
puting circuits are constructed on a silicon substrate and communicate by
means of pulses of electrical current sent over wires. Brains are not com-
puters, it is argued, because computers are made of silicon and wire, while
brains are made of neurons. We argue that, on the contrary, several of the
most fundamental aspects of the functional structure of a computer are dic-
tated by the logic of computation itself and that, therefore, they will be
observed in any powerful computational device, no matter what stuff it is
made of. In common with most contemporary neuroscientists, we believe
that brains are powerful computational devices. We argue, therefore, that
those aspects of the functional structure of a modern computer that are dic-
tated by the logic of computation must be critical parts of the functional
structure of brains. (Gallistel & King 2010: 167)
13
Jeffrey Watumull & Noam Chomsky
This argument simply reiterates Turing’s (1950: 446) thesis that “[i]f we wish
to find such similarities [as may exist between minds and machines] we should
look [not at their substrates, but] rather for mathematical analogies of function”.
And given this universality of the functional, mathematical architecture of com-
putation, it is possible that we may need to rethink how uniquely human or even
uniquely biological our modes of mental computation really are. One interesting
implication is that we must rethink any presumptions that extraterrestrial intel-
ligence or artificial intelligence would really be all that different from human
intelligence.
So we assume that human language is a computational process that can be
characterized by a Turing machine (see Watumull 2015). It is possible to explore
the space of all possible Turing machines (i.e., the space of all possible computer
programs), not exhaustively of course, but with sufficient breadth and depth to
make some profound discoveries. The late Marvin Minsky, founder of the arti-
ficial intelligence laboratory at MIT, and his student Daniel Bobrow, once enu-
merated and ran some thousands of the simplest Turing machines (computer
programs with minimal numbers of rules). Intriguingly, out of the infinity of
possible behaviors, only a surprisingly small subset emerged. These divided into
the trivial and the nontrivial. The boring programs either halted immediately
or erased the input data or looped indefinitely or engaged in some similar silli-
ness. The remainder, however, were singularly interesting: all of these programs
executed an effectively identical counting function – a primitive of elementary
arithmetic. In fact, this operation reduces to a form ofMerge (see Chomsky 2008).
More generally, these “A-machines” (A for arithmetic) prove a point:
[I]t seems inevitable that, somewhere, in a growing mind some A-machines
must come to be. Now, possibly, there are other, really different ways to
count. So there may appear, much, much later, some of what we represent
as ‘B-machines’ – which are processes that act in ways which are similar,
but not identical to, how the A-machines behave. But, our experiment hints
that even the very simplest possible B-machine will be so much more com-
plicated that it is unlikely that any brain would discover one before it first
found many A-machines. (Minsky 1985: 121)
Let us think of this exploration as exposing parts of some infinite ‘universe
of possible computational structures’. Then this tiny fragment of evidence




Figure 1.1: Representation of a universe with “A” and “B-machines”
(Minsky 1985: 120)
This is evidence that arithmetic – the foundation of any mathematical/com-
putational system – as represented in an A-machine – reducible to Merge – is
technically an attractor in the phase space of possible mathematical structures:
any entity who searches through the simplest processes will soon find frag-
ments which do not merely resemble arithmetic but are arithmetic. It is not
a matter of inventiveness or imagination, only a fact about the geography
of the universe of computation. (Minsky 1985: 122)
Curiously, some physicists have argued that human mathematics is contingent:
“the next batch of aliens might turn out to be different” (Alford 2006: 774), with
no recognizable rules or systems. This objection echoes once regnant dogma in
linguistics that “[human] languages could differ from each other without limit
and in unpredictable ways” such that linguists ought to proceed “without any
preexistent scheme of what a language must be” (Joos 1957: 96, v), implying that
any two human languages could be as different from each other as any one could
be from an alien language. But this dogma could not withstand critical scrutiny,
and was dispelled with the advent of generative linguistics and its formulation
of universal grammar – the theory of the abstract grammatical system encoded
genetically in Homo sapiens sapiens – and crucially by the deeper empirical in-
quiries into the languages of the world undertaken within the framework of
generative grammar (e.g., the spectacular demonstration that Warlpiri, contrary
to all appearances, has the standard hierarchical structures universal to natural
languages (see Hale 1976; Legate 2001). To the extent that SMT is true, general
properties derivative of this formal system define the properties universal to par-
ticular languages. Therefore we should indeed study these particular languages
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with a “preexistent scheme of what a language must be” because UG and general
principles of computation constrain the space of possible linguistic properties.
And thus languages could not “differ from each other without limit”, but only in
“[predictable] ways”.
The thesis that arithmetic is an attractor in the phase space of possible math-
ematical structures obviously generalizes beyond arithmetic to all simple com-
putations (see Wolfram 2002 for countless examples). “Because of this, we can
expect certain ‘a priori’ structures to appear, almost always, whenever a com-
putational system evolves by selection from a universe of possible processes”
(Minsky 1985: 119). Analogously, we submit that it is not implausible that an evo-
lutionary search through the simplest computations will soon find something
like Merge. Merge is an operation so elementary as to be subsumed somehow in
every more complex computational procedure: take two objects X and Y already
constructed and form the object Z without either modifying X or Y, or impos-
ing any additional structure on them: thus Merge(X, Y) = {X, Y}.4 This simple
assumption suffices to derive in a principled (necessary) way a complex array
of otherwise arbitrary (contingent) phenomena such as the asymmetry of the
conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor interfaces (entailing the locus of sur-
face complexity and variety), the ubiquity of dislocation, structure-dependence,
minimal structural distance for anaphoric and other construals, the difference
between what reaches the mind for semantic interpretation and what reaches
the apparatus of articulation and perception (see Chomsky 2017).
6 The dawn of language
As we discussed in terms of our economy thesis, simplicity can be defined in
algorithmic information theory (or the theory of program-size complexity): the
complexity of a program is measured by its maximally compressed length in bits
so that the simplest program is that with the shortest description. A search of
the phase space of possible programs, whether conducted consciously (e.g., by
us, extraterrestrials, etc.) or unconsciously (e.g., by modern computers, evolu-
tion, etc.) automatically proceeds in size order from the shortest and increasing
to programs no shorter than their outputs (these incompressible programs are
effectively lists); many complex programs would subsume simpler programs as
the real numbers subsume the natural numbers. And, as demonstrated logically
and empirically, “any evolutionary process must first consider relatively simple
4This formulation ofMerge requires some rethinking inways thatwe can put aside here (seeWa-
tumull et al. in press for discussion).
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systems, and thus discover the same, isolated, islands of efficiency” (Minsky 1985:
122).Why are the simple systems (e.g., Merge) so sparsely distributed in the phase
space of possible processes? (Why are they “islands” in the computational uni-
verse?) Why are there no “similar” processes in the neighborhood? (There is not
something “like” arithmetic out there: there is just arithmetic, “cold and austere,
[…] yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the great-
est art can show” in Bertrand Russell’s words.) The answer must be that small
sets of rules (e.g., Merge) can generate unbounded complexity, but the converse
is not in general true: it is simply a mathematical fact (a tautology) that there is
only a small set of small sets of rules, and thus not all complex phenomena can be
generated by small sets of rules (there is simply not a sufficient number of small
sets of rules “to go around”). This explains why, for instance, one cannot fiddle
with arithmetic: one cannot posit its simple rules, generate a universe of conse-
quences, and then make changes to that universe and expect the simple rules
to cover the “revised” universe (e.g., one cannot remove a number or change a
sum, product, etc.). Analogously, having posited Merge and executed it to gener-
ate the discrete infinity of syntactic structures, one cannot modify the logic (e.g.,
structure dependence) that obtains of those structures by dint of their having
been generated by Merge and still expect Merge to generate new structures that
conform to the modified logic, for the modified system is now “miraculous” in
the technical sense of possessing properties that did not emerge from the rules
themselves (or nonarbitrary third factors, i.e., laws of nature). And there cannot
be infinitely many sets of small rules in the neighborhood of Merge to produce
the effect of continuity. Thus there can only be islands of computation, not con-
tinents.
Thus it may well be that, given the universal and invariant laws of evolution,
convergence on systems – Turing machines – virtually identical to those “dis-
covered” in our evolutionary history is inevitable.5 Hence our rethinking the
proposition “Martian could be different”.
The fact that simple computations are attractors in the phase space of possible
computations goes someway to explainingwhy language should be optimally de-
signed (insofar as SMT holds) in that an evolutionary search is likely to converge
on it, which leads us to consideration of the origin of language. Convergence is
a consequence of constraints. As with intelligence, evolution and development
are possible only by coupling scope with constraints. Stated generally: the scope
5Indeed we might speculate that were we to “wind the tape of life back” and play it again, in
Stephen Jay Gould’s phrasing, not only would something like Merge reemerge, but something
like humans could well be “inevitable”, as some biologists have suggested (see Conway Morris
2013).
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of any creative process is a function of its operating within limits. In the context
of evolution, for instance, Stuart Kauffman (1993: 118) observes,
Adaptive evolution is a search process – driven bymutation, recombination,
and selection – on fixed or deforming fitness landscapes. An adapting pop-
ulation flows over the landscape under these forces. The structure of such
landscapes, smooth or rugged, governs both the evolvability of populations
and the sustained fitness of their members. The structure of fitness land-
scapes inevitably imposes limitations on adaptive search.
The analogy tomind is deeply nontrivial, for “intellectual activity consists mainly
of various kinds of search” (Turing 1948: 431).
The evolution of language is mysterious (see Hauser et al. 2014), but SMT is
consistent with the limited archeological evidence that does exist on the emer-
gence of language, evidently quite recently and suddenly in the evolutionary
time frame (see Tattersall 2012).6 Furthermore there is compelling evidence for
SMT in the design of language itself. For instance, it is a universal truth of nat-
ural language that the rules of syntax-semantics are structure-dependent (see
Berwick et al. 2011): hierarchy, not linearity, is determinative in the application
of rules and interpretation of expressions. This implies a far-reaching thesis with
many consequences: linear order is a peripheral property of language, emerging
only in externalization at the sensory-motor interface (where serial ordering is
necessary). If this thesis holds generally, then Aristotle’s dictum that language
is “sound with meaning” should be revised: language is not sound with mean-
ing, but rather meaning with sound (or some other modality of externalization),
a very different concept, reflecting a different traditional idea: that language is
fundamentally an instrument of thought – “audible thinking”, “the spoken in-
strumentality of thought”, as William Dwight Whitney expressed the traditional
conception (see Chomsky 2013), consistent with the Cartesian idea that language
is a central component of ourmind as a “universal instrument”, endowing uswith
general intelligence. As François Jacob suggested (see Berwick & Chomsky 2011),
plausibly, “the role of language as a communication system between individuals
would have come about only secondarily” to the emergence of generative syntax
(Merge, we would now say) and its mapping of structures to the conceptual-
intentional system for semantic interpretation. “The quality of language that
makes it unique does not seem to be so much its role in communicating direc-
tives for action” or other typical features of animal communication, but rather
6There is quite compelling evidence that since the trek of our ancestors fromAfrica some 50,000
years ago, the language faculty has undergone no significant change, and not very long before
(in evolutionary time) there is no evidence that it existed at all.
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“its role in symbolizing, in evoking cognitive images”, in molding our notion of
reality and yielding our capacity for thought and planning, through its unique
property of allowing “infinite combinations of symbols” and therefore “mental
creation of possible worlds”. Thus the most reasonable speculation today – and
one that opens productive lines of research – is that from some simple rewiring
of the brain, Merge emerged, naturally in its simplest form, providing the basis
for unbounded and creative thought – the “great leap forward” evidenced in the
archeological record and in the remarkable differences distinguishing modern
humans from their predecessors and the rest of the animal kingdom (see Huy-
bregts 2017; Berwick & Chomsky 2016 for in-depth discussion of these topics).
If this conjecture can be sustained, we could answer the question why lan-
guage should be optimally designed: optimality would be expected under the pos-
tulated conditions, with no selectional or other pressures operating; the emerg-
ing system should just follow the laws of nature such as minimal computation
andmore “general considerations of conceptual naturalness that have some inde-
pendent plausibility, namely, simplicity, economy, symmetry, nonredundancy,
and the like” – rather the way a snowflake forms. If this is correct, then, con-
trary to what was once presumed, there would be a priori reasons to expect any
language anywhere in the universe would resemble human language; the “princi-
ples, conditions, and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages”
would be logically necessary, deriving from laws of nature. And so, just as physi-
cists seek “an idea so simple, so beautiful, that […] we will all say to each other,
how could it have been otherwise?”, in the study of language we search for – and
are discovering – objects of great beauty and simplicity.
7 The wonders of language
It is […] quite possible that we, as a species, have crossed a cognitive thre-
shold. Our capacity to express anything, through the recursive syntax and
compositional semantics of natural language, might have taken us into a
cognitive realm where anything, everything, is possible. Effectively, having
language has made us the equal of any extraterrestrial.
(Roberts 2017: 181–182)
Notwithstanding the universal logic of computation, it is obviously necessary
that there exist constraints on the mind if it is to have any scope at all, and these
constraints may very well be uniquely human. Taking the extreme case, sup-
pose that the human mind is a universal Turing machine (see Watumull 2015).
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Such a mind could be a universal explainer. The argument is simple: a universal
Turing machine can emulate any other Turing machine (i.e., a universal com-
puter can run any program); a program is a kind of theory (written to be read-
able/executable by a computer); thus a universal Turing machine can compute
any theory; and thus, assuming that everything in the universe could in prin-
ciple be explained by and understood within some theory or other (in other
words, assuming nomagic, miracles, etc.), a universal Turingmachine – a Turing-
universal mind – could explain and understand everything. It is an intriguing
conclusion, and not obviously false, but numerous objections could be posed.
For instance,
an arbitrary Turing machine, or an unrestricted rewriting system, is too
unstructured to serve as a grammar […]. Obviously, a computer program
that succeeded in generating sentences of a language would be, in itself, of
no scientific interest unless it also shed some light on the kinds of structural
features that distinguish languages from arbitrary, recursively enumerable
sets. (Chomsky 1963: 360)
Beyond language, if a Turing-universal mind is to be a universal explainer, it
should not generate all possible explanations, true and false, because that would
be merely to restate the problem of explaining nature: deciding which in an infi-
nite set of explanations are the true (or best) explanations is as difficult as con-
structing the best explanations in the first place. There must be “limits on admis-
sible hypotheses”, in the words of Charles Sanders Peirce (see Chomsky 2006).
This interdependence of scope and limits has been expounded by many creative
thinkers and analyzed by (creative) philosophers of esthetics: the beauty of jazz
emerges not by “playing anything”, but only when the improvisation is struc-
tured, canalized; the beauty of a poem is a function of its having to satisfy the
constraints of its form, as themathematician StanislawUlam (1976: 180) observed,
When I was a boy I felt that the role of rhyme in poetry was to compel
one to find the unobvious because of the necessity of finding a word which
rhymes. This forces novel associations and almost guarantees deviations
from routine chains or trains of thought. It becomes paradoxically a sort of
automatic mechanism of originality.
Thus from science to art, we see that the (hypothesized) infinite creativity of the
Turing-universal human mind is non-vacuous and useful – and beautiful – only
if it operates within constraints – constraints that appear to be uniquely human.
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So understanding language means understanding a very big part of what it
is to be human, what it is to be you. And that is perhaps the greatest wonder
of language of all. (Roberts 2017: 182)
The wonders of language Ian Roberts has illuminated are beyond counting; we
have surveyed but a twinkling here. Indeed, of his work we might say, in closing,
“my God! – it’s full of stars!” (Clarke 1968: 202).
Abbreviations
SMT strong Minimalist thesis UG Universal Grammar
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